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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
EUGENE MEYERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 
10944 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant appeals from a judgement of convic-
tion of the crime of possession of narcotic drugs 
rendered by a jury on February 8, 1967, in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux, presidng. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On November 19, 1965, appellant was charged 
by information with the crime of unlawfully posses-
sing a narcotic drug, to wit: heroin and demerol 
(TR-360). On November 261 1965, appellant filed a 
motion to supress certain items of evidence. On De-
cember 2, 1965, the motion was denied in a memo-
2 
randum decision of the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
(TR-362, -370). On April 29, 1966, a hearing was held 
on appellant's motion to quash the search warrant 
before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, which mo· 
tion was denied. Appellant was convicted of the of· 
fense charged on February 8, 1967, and on March 
3, 1967, appellant's motion for new trial was heard 
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux and was de-
nied, whereupon an appeal of such conviction was 
taken to this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of con-
viction of the offense of unlawfully possessing a 
narcotic drug be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 28th day of May, 1965, a petition was 
filed in the Second District Juvenile Court of Sait 
Lake County, State of Utah, by William A. Kerr, a 
probation officer of such court, alleging that Eliza-
beth Ann Glasg]ow, then age fifteen, was a de-
pendent child whose future custody should be ad-
judicated by that court. On June 28, 1965, the peti-
tion was amended indicating that said child did, on 
June 10, 1965, run away from the home of her aunt 
and uncle (in whose home such child had been re-
siding), and that her whereabouts remained un-
known until Tune 28, 1965 (TR-358). On that date, a 
search and seizure warrant was issued by Judge R. 
W. Garff, Jr. of that court commanding any peace 
3 
officer of the State of Utah to "forthwith take into 
custody the . . . child, and detain her in the Salt 
Lake County Detention Center; that if need be, said 
officer may enter by force the residence ... " of Dave 
Beckstead and Eugene Meyers at 553 Third Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for the purpose of searching 
for said child. 
Armed with the search warrant, Officer Fran 
Kari of the Salt Lake City Police Department, accom-
panied by officers Donald Lindsey and Dan Waters 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, went to the 
residence 1ocated at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on June 29, 1965 (TR-153). A search was 
made of the premises to find the child, or evidence 
as to her whereabouts (TR-158, -159). At the time of 
the arrival by the officers at the residence located 
at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, they had a con-
versation with a Mr. Floyd Brown, property man-
ager for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, 
which company at that time was managing the res-
idence (TR-116). Mr. Brown gave the officers permis-
sion to enter the house after being advised that they 
possessed a search warrant (TR-119, 154). 
The residence at 553 Third Avenue had been 
rented by Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company 
to a Mrs. James Gibson (TR-116). Mrs. James Gibson 
was later identified by Mr. Brown to be Virginia 
Hall (TR-117. 201). 
Immediately preceeding the arrival of the offi-
cers, Mr. Brown was on the premises investigating 
a nuisance complaint lodged by a neighbor (TR-
4 
117). At that time the doorbell rang and Mr. Brown 
proceeded to the front of the house where he saw ' 
the appellant, Eugene Meyers. Brown asked appel-
lant what he was doing there, whereupon the ap-
pellant informed Brown that he was there to cut the 
lawn and that he was a friend of Mrs. Gibson (TR-
118). 
When the officers and Mr. Brown entered the 
residence, they found Mr. Meyers standing behind 
the kitchen door (TR-119, 170). Officer Lindsey in-
quired of appellant what he was doing, and appel- 1 
lant advised Officer Lindsey that he was there to , 
cut the lawn (TR-170). Officer Kari advised appellant 1 
that the officers were there in an effort to locate the ' 
runaway child. Meyers replied that the only girl at 
the residence was a sister of the tenant. Meyers ad-
vised Officer Kari that he did not know where she 
was at that time, but that he thought the older sister , 
had taken the child to the doctor because of illness. 
Officer Kari then asked appellant if it was all 
right if the officers were to "look the place over," 
whereupon appellant replied that "it was all right 
with him. He was just there to mow the lawn." (TR-
155). 
A search was made of the premises. The offi-
cers advised appellant that they had a search and 
seizure warrant for that residence. The appellant 1 
claimed he did not live at the residence, and did not 
ask to see the search warrant (TR-49, -50, -54). 
The search was made by the officers of the main 
floor and the second floor. A bedroom, designated 
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as bedroom "A" on Exhibit 2-D (TR-32), was locked. 
Mr. Brown obtained a key to that bedroom, which 
was ultimately searched by the officers. 
The runaway child was not present in that bed-
room. However, the officers, in searching for evi-
dence as to her whereabouts, did find a paper sack 
containing what was later determined to be narcot-
ics (TR-233, -234). 
Certain items belonging to the appellant were 
found in bedroom 11 A" and were taken by the police 
officers. Included among those items were an auto-
motive repair bill with appellant's name on it (TR-
283); a Utah drivers license in the name of appel-
lant (TR-301); and prescription bottles with appel-
lant's name on the labels (TR-60). Certain other items 
were taken from the bedroom designated as bed-
room 11A, 11 including certain clothing, a tool box, 
a car battery, a TV-record player, and records (TR-
173, 180). Those items were taken at the request of 
Mr. Brown, who was in the process of evicting those 
tenants from that residence (TR-186). 
Testimony was given by Officer Lindsey that on 
two occasions the appellant had a conversation with 
the officer in which he requested the return of cer-
tain items taken from bedroom "A." Included in the 
request were the clothing, records, auto battery and 
record player (TR-190, 195, 196, 209). 
As to other factual maters, respondent relies on 
the Statement of Facts contained in appellant's brief 
on appeal. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICERS WERE PROPERLY ON 
THE PREMISES SEARCHED AND ANY NAR-
COTICS SEIZED AS A RESULT THEREOF 
COULD PROPERLY BE USED AS EVIDENCE 
AGAINST APPELLANT. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 (1963) pro-
vides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess, 
have under his control. ... any narcotic drug except 
as authorized in this act. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 58-l 3a-29 (Supp. 
1967) provides: 
All narcotic drugs, or other habit-forming drugs, 
depressants or stimulants as defined in this act, ... 
may be seized by any peace officer; ... 
The officers, in searching the premises at 553 
Third Avenue, were looking for the whereabouts 
of the runaway child or evidence as to her where-
abouts (TR-34, 122). In the course of their search for 
such evidence, they observed certain i terns which, 
in the opinion of officers Lindsey and Waters, were 
narcotics. As such, the officers, seized the contra-
band and secured it for later testing by the State 
chemist (TR-198). 
The officers had a search warrant issued by 
the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County which auth-
orized them to 
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forthwith take into custody the above child 
and detain her in the Salt Lake County Detention 
Center; that if need be, said officer may enter by 
force the residence of Dave Beckstead for the pur-
pose of searching for said child. 
The search warrant was issued pursuant to the 
provisions of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23 
(1963), the pertinent provisions of which are: 
When it appears to the court on petition filed by 
any person who in the opinion of the court is bona 
fide acting in the inerest of any child, that there 
is reasonable cause to suspect that such child under 
eighteen years has been or is being ill-treated, is 
dependent or neglected, in any place within the 
jurisdiction of the court, in a manner likely to cause 
the child unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious 
to its health or morals, the court may issue a war-
rant authorizing any ... peace officer ... to search 
for the child, and to take and detain it in a place 
of safety ... Any person authorized by such search 
warrant served upon ... the c.ustodian of the 
premises to search for any child and to take it and 
detain it ... may enter, ... by force, any house, 
building or other place specified in the warrant, 
and may remove the child therefrom. 
A petition had been filed in the Second District 
Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County in the interest 
of Elizabeth Ann Glosgow on May 28, 1965, and 
amended on June 28, 1965 alleging that said child 
did "run away from the home of her aunt .and uncle 
on June 10, 1965, and her whereabouts remained 
unknown until June 28, 1965" (TR-358). The petition 
was signed by William A. Kerr, a probation officer. 
The petition was verified by Mr. Kerr. 
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Utah Const. Art. I:§ 14 states: 
... no warrant shall be issued but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized 
Respondent submits that the requirements ol 
Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23 (1963) and 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 were fully met, the issuance 
of the warrant was proper and the warrant was 
valid. A verified petition was on file with the Juve· 
nile Court and executed by Mr. Kerr, a person ob· 
viously acting in the interest of the child. Officer · 
Kari further swore before Judge Garff of the Juve· 
nile Court as to the facts surrounding her kn owl· 
edge concerning the child's whereabouts prior to 
the issuance of the search warrant by Judge Garf! 
(TR-11. 13, 14). 
Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23 (1963) 
requires that there be reasonable cause for the Juve-
nile Court to suspect that a child under eighteen 
years is neglected or in any place likely to be in· 
jurious to the health or morals of the child. If the 
court so suspects, it may issue a warrant authoriz· 
ing any peace officer to search for the child, take it 
and detain it. 
In this instance the Juvenile Court determined 
there was reasonable cause to suspect the child 
was in a place likely to be injurious to her health 
and morals, and accordingly issued the warrant. 
There appeared probable cause for the issuance of 
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the warrant, which was supported by the oath of 
Officer Kari. Since the statute under which the 
search warrant was issued required no execution 
of an affidavit in support of the search warrant, as 
it" presently required by Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code 
Ann. § 55-10-l 11 (Supp. 1967) and is also required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-4 (1953), there was no 
violation of either Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. § 
55-10-23 (1963), Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 or United 
States Const. Amend. IV and XN. 
Armed with the search warrant, the officers 
went to the premises to be searched where they ob-
tained the permission and assistance of the prop-
erty manager for Tracy-Collins Trust Company (TR-
32, 54, 119). Narcotics were found and seized. 
The state will concede that as a general propo-
sition property other than that for which the search 
is being made under authority of a warrant cannot 
be seized under '.1uthority of the warrant if the prop-
erty seized does not come within the description of 
the warrant, but where the officer has entered the 
premises upon a valid search warrant and finds con-
traband or property the possession of which is il-
legal, the officer has the right to seize such property 
although it was not described in the warrant. See 
Brooks v. State, 235 Md. 23, 200 A.2d 127 (1964); Peo-
ple v. Collier. 169 Cal. App. 19, 336 P.2d 582 (1959). 
It has been repeatedly held that, even though 
not specifically described in a search warrant other-
wise valid, the seizure of items, the possession of 
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which constitutes a crime or which are instrumental-
ities or fruits of crime, is valid. 
In the case of State v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254 
Pac. 10 (1927), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
the seizure of certain papers not particularly de-
scribed in the search warrant. The Court stated: 
While it is a general rule that the officer, in execut-
ing his search warrant, has no right to seize any 
property by virtue of such warrant other than that 
described therein, this does not effect his duty, if 
lawfully upon the premises, to seize property that 
he discovers by his own senses as being then and 
there used as an instrumentality in the commission 
of a crime. 
See also Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251 (9th 
Cir. 1925), in which officers lawfully on the premises 
pursuant to a search and seizure warrant confiscat· 
ed other evidence not contemplated within the 
search warrant, which confiscation and seizure was 
upheld on the basis that the possession of liquor 
and maintenance of a nuisance were continuing of· 
fenses and that these offenses were committed in 
the presence of the officers making the search and 
seizure. See also Saunders v. United States. 238 F.2d 
145 (10th Cir. 1956), and Zachary v. United States, 
275 F.2d 793, (6th Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364 U.S. 816, 
reh. den., 364 U.S. 906 (1960). During the course of 
the search, the officers found objects constituting 
contraband, or which they suspected as being con· 
traband. and as such they were entitled to take into 
custody such objects. See Ker v. California, 374 US. 
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23, (1 %3); Heffley- v. State. 83 Nev. _, ___ , __ , 423 P.2d 666 
(1967). 
See also the case of State v. Wesson. Iowa 150 
N.W.2d 284 (1967) in which officers searched a hotel 
room for stolen checks and found stolen bonds, 
possession of which was a crime. The Nebraska 
court held that if the search was valid, the Fourth 
Amendment did not prevent seizure of other prop-
erty the possession of which is a crime. See also 
Harris v. United States. 331 U.S. 145, (1947); 79 C.J.S., 
Search and Seizure. § 83 (e) (1952). 
In the case of State v. McMann. 3 Ariz. App. 
111, 412 P.2d 286 (1966), police officers obtained a 
search warrant to search the defendant's residence 
for marijuana. During the course of the search, the 
officers discovered heroin, the possession -of which 
constituted a crime for which defendant was -con-
victed. Defendant objected to the introductiori of 
the heroin, claiming it should have been surpressed 
as it was not described in the warrant. In affirming 
the judgment of conviction, the court found no merit 
to this contention. 
It is well established that if a search produces 
something different from that for which the officers-, 
were initially searching it does not rende~ the sei~-J 
ure of contraband invalid, since the officers do not 
have to blind themselves to that which is apparent 
merely because it is disconnected with the purpose 
for which the search is initiated. See People v. 
Smith. 26 Cal. Reptr. 620 (1962); United States ex rel, 
Stoner v. Myers. 219 F.Supp. 908 (D.C. Pa. 1963); Peo.:. 
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pie v. R'.raps, 48 Cal. Reptr. 89 (1965); State v. Blood, 
190 Kan. 812, 378 P.2d 548 (1963). 
Since the contraband narcotics seized by the 
officers was lawfully obtained, it could be used to 
prosecute appellant for an offense totally unrelated 
to that upon which the search was founded. See 
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, (1920); and 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
In Harris v. U.S., supra, the court stated at 331 
U.S. 145, 155: 
... A crime was thus being committed in the very 
presence of the agents conducting the search. Noth-
ing in the decisions of the court give support to the 
suggestion that under such circumstances the law-
enforcement officials must impotently stand aside 
and refrain from seizing such contraband material. 
If entry upon the premises be authorized and the 
search which followed be valid, there is nothing in 
the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure 
by law-enforcement agents of ... property the pos-
session of which is a crime, even though the officers 
are not aware that such property is on the premises 
when the search is initiated. 
Even though the search of the apartment was 
authorized for one purpose, i.e., the runaway girl, 
the taking of contraband narcotics found in that 
search would not be in violation of appellant's con-
stitutional rights. The evidence was admissable 
against defendant in this action, and the trial court 
properly refused to quash the warrant or suppress 
the evidence. 
13 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DISCLAIMED AND DIS-
AVOWED ANY INTEREST IN THE PREMISES 
SEARCHED, CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH, 
AND THEREFOR LACKED STANDING TO 
MOVE TO SUPPRESS J'.-~ARCOTICS SEIZED AS 
A RESULT OF THE SEARCH. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. (emphasis added.) 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14, provides, in effect, the 
same guarantees against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States has been made applicable to the 
states and enforceable against the states through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Wolfe v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, (1949); Ker 
v. California. supra. A person may waive his right to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizures, and 
no rule of public policy forbids such waiver. One 
can validly consent to a search of his premises, and 
consent will render competent the evidence thus 
obtained. By consent to a search and waiver of right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
the defendant relinquishes the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
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which prohibits unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, and also relinquished protection given by the : 
state constitution's provision against unlawful search 
and seizure. See State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, S.E.2d 
61 (1961); People v. Harris, 34 Ill.2d 282, 215 N.E.2d 
214, cert. den. 384 "Q.1.' 993 (1966). Although a con-
sent to a search must be proved by the prosecution 
by clear and positive evidence and that there must 
be no duress or c~of("~actual or implied, the 
prosecution must show that consent is unequivical 
and specific, freely and intelligently given. (See 
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (C.A.D.C. 1951); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, (1938). 
In this instance the officers were validly on the 
premises to make a search thereof. Consequently, 
the consent, or lack thereof, by the appellant was 
not necessary in order for the officers to search the 
premises. 
Although appellant argues that he did not con-
sent, and that he did not waive any interest in and 
to the premises to be searched or disclaim any in-
terest in and to the premises to be searched, it has 
been stated that the determination of the voluntari-
ness of the consent must be tested by the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding t h e purported 
waiver or disclaimer of the constitutional rights. See 
Shultz v. United States, 351 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1965), 
United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763 (2nd Cir. 1959). 
All the evidence, including the various circum-
stances of the giving of consent or disclaimer, must 
be objectively viewed with diligent care by the triai 
15 
court, and if the court finds no evidence showing 
coersion or duress, it is proper to hold that the con-
sent was voluntary or the disclaimer was voluntary 
and was knowledgable on the part of the defendant. 
Since the appellant, at the time of his motion to 
suppress, motion to quash, or at the time of trial, 
offered no testimony or evidence contradictory to 
the evidence concerning his disclaimer and waiver, 
the statement of facts regarding his disclaimer and 
waiver remains unchallenged. 
Such was the finding of the trial court, and the 
appellant offered no contradictory evidence with 
respect thereto. It follows that this court should up-
hold that determination by the trial court. Since the 
trial court, having the advantage of seeing and hear-
ing the witnesses and being able to evalucate their 
credibility, is in the best position to weigh the signi-
ficance of the pertinent facts involved and deter-
mine whether, under the totality of all the facts and 
circumstances, the defendant voluntarily consented 
to the search or disclaimed any interest in and to 
the property to be searched, this court should af-
firm that determination of the trial court. 
In disclaimin-J and disavowing any interest in 
the premises, the appellant stated he was just there 
to cut the lawn (TR-118, 155, 170). He further con-
sented that the search "was all right with him" (TR-
155). He claimed he did not live at the residence to 
be searched, and did not ask to see the search war-
rant (TR-49, 50, 54). Respondent submits that this un-
controverted testimony constitutes a disclaimer and 
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disavowal of any interest in and to the premises 
searched, and further constitutes a consent to 
search. 
The following cases have held language simi-
lar to that of appellant's sufficient to constitute con-
sent to search: 
People v. Hood, 149 Cal. App. 36, 309 P.2d 135 
(1957)-"Go ahead." 
People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956) 
--"Go ahead." 
Ia re Watson's Petition, 146 Mont. 125, 404 P.2d 
315 (1965)-"Yes, go right ahead; I have nothing 
to hide." 
People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 88, 314 P.2d 58 
(1957) ,-"Go right ahead." 
People v. McCoy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1961)-"Well, 
go ahead. It's not my room." 
State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 
(1965)-If they (Town Marshall) wanted to go 
ahead knowing they were violating the law to make 
the search, ... they could go. 
As a general proposition, the law with respect 
to disclaimer of interest is stated in 79 C.J.S. Search· 
es and Seizures, § 60 ( 1952) as follows: 
When a person disclaims interest in the premises 
or possessions searched, or in the article seized, he 
cannot question the legality of the search and 
seizure. 
See also Show v. United States, 209 F.2d 298 
(C.A.,D.C. 1953). cei;f den. 347 U.S. 905 (1954); Com· 
monwealth v. Mayer, 359 Mass 253, 207 NE.2d 686 
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(1965); Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 
1958); Neil v. State, 206 Tenn. 492, 344 S.W.2d 731 
(1960). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the search warrant 
issued by the Juvenile Court was invalid, the ap-
pellant nonetheless consented to the search and 
disclaimed any interest in the premises searched 
or property seized. As such he cannot now claim 
that his rights have been violated. Respondent sub-
mits, however, that the officers were legally on the 
premises by reason of the search warrant, and the 
appellant's consent and disclaimer further supports 
the validity of the search and seizure. 
By reason of the disclaimer and consent of ap-
pellant, he lacked standing to move to suppress the 
narcotics seized. Appellant relies heavily on the 
case of United States v, Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
However that case is easily distinguishable in that 
in the Jeffers case the police officers who conducted 
thes earch of the hotel room which Jeffers had ac-
cess to did not have a search warrant, nor were the 
occupants of the room present at the time of the 
search. The court stated at 342 U.S. 52: 
... In entering the room and making the search 
for the sole purpose of seizing respondent's nar-
cotics, the officers not only proceeded without a 
warrant or other legal authority, but their intrusion 
was conducted surreptitiously and by means de-
nounced as criminal. 
In this case, as previously pointed out, the offi-
cers were on the premises properly, armed with a 
18 
warrant, and further had the consent of defendant 
to search and his disclaimer and disavowal of any 
interest in and to the premises. 
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, (1960), the 
defendant was present at the time of the search. The 
court, at 362 U.S. 267, recognized that: 
... anyone legitimately on premises where a search 
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a mo-
tion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be 
used against him. 
1he question then posed is whether or not the 
appellant was legitimatelv on the premises in order 
that the merits of his motion to suppress be adjudi-
cated. The trial court, having considered the same. 
concluded that the appellant had no proper stand· 
ing to move to suppress by reason of that fact that 
he had previously disclaimed any interest in and 
to the premises (see Memorandum Decision, TR 
362-370). 
The trial court could and did find that the ap· 
pellant's statement to the police amounted to a total 
disclaimer or disavowal of any right or interest in 
connection with the premises. Accordingly the 
police could take him at his word. The defendant 
cannot now be heard to complain that his constitu· 
tional rights were violated. 
In People v. McCoy, supra. a somewhat similar 
case wherein the defendant disclaimed any in· 
terest to the premises, the court held the_ evidence 
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seized admissable against defendant, stating at 16 
Cal. Rep tr. 117, 118: 
"We do not believe the appellant's false disclaimer 
of residency vitiated the consent given to search the 
room; the evidence obtained was not inadmissable 
as the product of an unlawful search and seizure." 
In the case of State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 
414 P.2d 958, 960, (1966), this court stated: 
In approaching the problem of standing, the origin 
and nature of the rule concerning suppression 
should be noted. Evidence is suppressed or exclud-
ed only if the same was obtained by a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a per-
son's right of privacy and property. Evidence sought 
to be excluded is admissable, however, until the ac-
cused has established that his rights under the rule 
have been invaded. Citing Murray v. United States, 
338 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1964). See Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.C. 125, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1960). 
Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of one 
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as 
a basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he 
alleges, and if the allegation be disputed, that he 
establish, that he himself was a victim of an in-
vasion of privacy. Under this philosophy, the appel-
lant has no standing because he was not a victim of 
an invasion of privacy. To give a person standing 
who neither alleges nor establishes the proprietory 
nor possessory interest in the car and who in fact 
was without ownership therein, so determined be-
fore the search was made, would clearly be an ex-
tention beyond the scope that the constitutional 
protection was intended to cover. 
The appellant did not in any sense contradict 
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the testimony of the officers, nor was there any eV]. 
dence offered by the appellant that there had been 
any coercion or that appellant was submitting to 
any implied authority at the occasion at the resl· 
dence located at 553 Third Avenue, or that appellant 
did not know what he was doing at the time. Full 
opportunity was afforded the appellant to show 
force, duress, or other improper methods used, il 
such was the fact. This he entirely failed to do. Ap-
pellant also failed to demonstrate that he was the 
victim of an invasion of privacy. 
Respondent submits that the trial court's finding 
in this regard should not be disturbed in view ol 
the fact that the evidence in the record does not 
compell a different finding since the appellant here-
in did not offer any testimony or evidence with re-
spect to such disclaimer of interest in and to the 
premises to be searched, waiver of his right to ob-
ject to the search, or consent to the search. See 
Cassity v. Castagno. 10 Utah 2d 16, 347 P.2d 834 
(1959); Napp v. Life Insurance Corp. of America, 8 
Utah 2d 220, 332 P.2d 662 (1959); DeVas v. Noble, 13 
Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, cert. den., 371 U.S. 82l 
(1962). 
As this Court stated in State v. Tuttle. supra, at 
399 P.2d 580, 582: 
"The practical exigencies of a trial render it imper-
ative that the trial judge have the PUfTogative of 
ruling upon questions of admissability of evidence 
and upon issues of fact incidental to that purpose. 
For this reason, and because of his position of ad-
vantage to observe the demeanor of witnesses and 
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other factors bearing on credibility, his ruling 
thereon should not be disturbed unless it clearly 
appears he was in error. If the court were not in-
dulged this prerogative and were bound by any 
story which a self-interested witness may tell which 
could make a search unlawful, it requires but brief 
reflection to reveal what mischief could result in 
thwarting efforts of officers proceeding reasonably 
and in good faith to solve crimes and enforce the 
law." 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT. 
Officer Lindsey testified as to certain conversa-
tions had with appellant following the filing of a 
complaint against appellant for this offense. The 
conversations did not take on the complexion of 
questioning or interrogation (TR-177, 178). 
The first conversation was a telephone call from 
appellant to Officer Lindsey, wherein, 
". . . he told me he wanted to get his things we had 
taken out of that apartment." (TR 178), (see also 
TR 195). 
The second conversation occurred in a police 
vehicle, also between appellant and Officer Lind-
sey. Among other subjects discussed, 
". . . Mr. Meyers said he wanted to get his stuff 
back." (TR 17.9), (see also TR 196). 
Prescription bottles were taken by the officers 
from bedroom "A" with the name "Eugene Meyers" 
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on the label (TR 198). Tablets, pills, capsules, and the 
prescription bottles were all found in a paper bag 
(TR 198). Certain of the contents of that bag were 
later determined to be narcotics (TR-232, 233, 234,). 
Appellant's driver's license was taken from the 
room, plus articles of clothing and other personal 
property (TR-301). Appellant stayed in bedroom "A", 
had a key to that bedroom, was seen coming and 
going from that residence, and was observed in 
bedroom "A" with a bottle containing pills (TR-135-
138). 
Respondent submits there was sufficient evi-
dence before the jury from which it could determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was 
guilty of the offense charged. 
Yet appellant complains that he was prejudiced 
by the trial court allowing Officer Lindsey's testi-
mony concerning the conversations had between 
the officer and appellant, since no MIRANDA warn-
ings were given to appellant. 
In the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 383 
U.S. 903 (1966) the Supreme Court specifically 
pointed out that the decision is limited to in-custody 
interrogation in a police dominated atmosphere. The 
Court stated at 86 S. Ct. 1612: 
"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody .. .' (emphasis added) 
The Court further stated at page 1630: 
-23 
"Any statement given freely and voluntarily with-
out any compelling- influence is, of course, admis-
sable in evidence ... There is no requirement that 
police stop a person . . . who calls the police to 
offer a confession or any other statement he desires 
to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are 
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and are not 
affected by our holding today." 
The telephone conversation was admitted in 
evidence as a declaration or admission against in-
terest by appellant, not as a confession to the crime 
charged. The second conversation for the same 
reason. There was no substantive difference in the 
two conversations. Neither conversation took on the 
complexion of questioning or interrogation, and it 
should be pointed out that the telephone conversa-
tion was initiated by the appellant. Respondent sub-
mits that both conversations were entered into vol-
untarily by appellant without any compelling in-
fluence whatsoever. 
Assuming, arguendo. that the second conver-
sation, standing alone, would not be admissable, 
respondent submits that bv reason of the fact that 
the first and second conversations are basically 
identical, the admission of the second conversation 
is at best harmless error with no resulting prejudice 
to appellant. There is nothing in the record to indi-
cate a denial of right or abuse of a privilege which 
put the appellant at any substantial disadvantage 
or prejudice by reason of the admission of the sec-
ond conversation. 
The alleged error in the admission of appel-
lant's statements ca.n and should be disregarded by 
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this Court. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (1953); State 
v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966); 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964). 
Neither error nor prejudice can be assumed by 
this Court, and the burden is upon the appellant to 
show error or prejudice. The underlying principle 
of protections afforded an accused is treatment in 
conformity with commonly accepted standards of 
decency and fairness. Respondent submits that ap-
pellant has failed to demonstrate, nor does the rec-
ord contain, any indication that appellant was not 
afforded a fair trial and in all regards treated de-
cently and fairly. See State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 
234, 419 P.2d 770 0966). 
The appellant was afforded the opportunity to 
have heard his motions · to suppress, motion to 
quash, trial by jury, motions to dismiss, motion for 
mistrial and motion for new trial. Appellant was rep-
resented by able counsel at all stages. He was given 
a full and fair opportunity to present his case. Ac-
cordingly, all presumptions favor the validity of the 
judgment. State v. Seymour, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the rul-
ings of the trial court with respect to appellant's 
motions to suppress, quash, dismiss, mistrial, new 
trial, and its ruling on the admissability of evidence 
were in all respects proper. Appellant has shown no 
basis upon which this court should grant the relief 
• 
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he asks. Accordingly respondent respectfully sub-
mits that the judgment of the district court be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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